Fair Low/Zero Carbon & 100% RE Strategies, South & North Countries, Villages, **including Women Initiatives UNFCCC COP21 Side Event, Paris, France December 3, 2015** 












## Setting the Scene of Zero Carbon Transitions in North and South

by prof. Kevin Anderson



Kevin Anderson University of Manchester Dec. 2015



Mon. 12<sup>th</sup> Oct 2015

commentary

## Duality in climate science

#### Kevin Anderson

Delivery of palatable 2 °C mitigation scenarios depends on speculative negative emissions or changing the past. Scientists must make their assumptions transparent and defensible, however politically uncomfortable the conclusions.

n July, Paris hosted 'Our Common Future Under Climate Change, a key conference organized as a prelude to the political negotiations scheduled for December 2015, also in Paris. In the conference summary that immediately followed, the scientific committee noted that limiting "warming to less than 2 °C" is "economically feasible" and "cost effective"1. The statement chimed with the press release that accompanied the Synthesis Report published by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) last November, in which IPCC representatives suggested that "to keep a good chance of staying below 2 °C, and at manageable costs, our emissions should drop by 40-70 per cent globally between 2010 and 2050, falling to zero or below by 2100"2, and that mitigation costs would be so low that "global economic growth would not be strongly affected"2.

If these up-beat — and largely uncontested - headlines are to be believed, reducing emissions in line with a reasonableto-good chance of meeting the 2 °C target requires an accelerated evolution away from fossil fuels; it does not, however, necessitate a revolutionary transition in how we use and produce energy. Such conclusions are forthcoming from many Integrated



Report, no more than 1,000 billion tonnes (1,000 Gt) of CO2 can be emitted between 2011 and 2100 for a 66% chance (or better) of remaining below 2 °C of warming (over preindustrial times)5. Without resorting to 'changing the past', or making the leap of faith that substantial amounts of CO. can be

negative-emission technologies. Even more worryingly, in all 56 scenarios without negative emissions, global emissions peak around 2010, which is contrary to available emissions data7.

In plain language, the complete set of 400 IPCC scenarios for a 50% or better

"to hold the increase in global temperature below 2 degrees Celsius, and take action to meet this objective consistent with science and on the basis of equity"





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"to hold the increase in global temperature below 2 degrees Celsius, and take action to meet this objective consistent with science and on the basis of equity"





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## IPCC latest report (AR5)

#### Crucially noted...

in terms of temperature (2°C) rise,


explicit recognition it's carbon budgets that matter,


not long-term (2050) targets




























### So recent history supports the IEA view


... that the CO<sub>2</sub> trend "is perfectly in line with a temperature increase of 6 degrees Celsius, which would have devastating consequences for the planet."


Fatih Birol - IEA chief economist

















## Returning to Carbon budgets





### Numerically: based on IPCC Synthesis Report






Table 2.2 [TABLE SUBJECT TO FINAL COPYEDIT]

		Cumula	tive CO <sub>2</sub>	emissions	from 1870	in GtCO	2		
Net anthropogenic	<1.5 °C			<2 °C			<3 °C		
warming a									
Fraction of	66%	50%	33%	66%	50%	33%	66%	50%	33%
simulations meeting goal <sup>b</sup>									
Complex	2250	2250	2550	2900	3000	3300	4200	4500	4850
models, RCP scenarios only <sup>c</sup>									
Simple model,	No data	2300-	2400-	2550-	2900-	2950-	n.a.e	4150-	5250-
WGIII		2350	2950	3150	3200	3800		5750	6000
scenarios <sup>d</sup>									
		Cumula	tive CO <sub>2</sub>	emissions	from 2011	in GtCO	2		
Complex	400	550	850	1000	1300	1500	2400	2800	3250
models, RCP									
scenarios									
only <sup>c</sup>									
Simple model,	No data	550-	600-	750-	1150-	1150-	n.a.e	2350-	3500-
WGIII		600	1150	1400	1400	2050		4000	4250
scenarios <sup>d</sup>									

Total fossil carbon available in 2011<sup>1</sup>: 3670–7100 GtCO<sub>2</sub> (reserves) & 31300–50050 GtCO<sub>2</sub> (resources)



... defined as a "likely" chance of "staying below 2°C"

#### Estimating energy-only CO<sub>2</sub> budgets from 2015 to 2100

#### We need to note that:


- Since 2011, we've emitted about ~150GtCO<sub>2</sub> (~15% of "likely" 2°C budget)
- Deforestation & land-use change from 2015-2100 ~100GtCO<sub>2</sub>
- Cement process emissions from 2015-2100 ~150GtCO<sub>2</sub>

i.e.: ... to subtract, at least 400GtCO<sub>2</sub> from the energy budget from 2015





... to stay below 2°C



i.e.: the budgets from 2015 -2100 for CO<sub>2</sub> from energy only

### Considering poorer (non-Annex 1) nations:

**GtCO<sub>2</sub>** (2015-2100)

- 1. Peak CO<sub>2</sub> 2025; mitigate 10% p.a. from 2035
- 2. Peak **2025**; mitigate **5%** from **2035**
- 3. Peak **2030**; mitigate **5%** from **2035**

Consider these in relation to 2°C budgets ...

1.	600GtCO <sub>2</sub> )	50% (900GtCO2)	33% (1100GtCO2)
2.	66%	50%	33%







### Considering wealthier (Annex 1) nations:

**GtCO<sub>2</sub>** (2015-2100)

- 1. Peak now; mitigate 5% p.a. from 2025
- 2. Peak now; mitigate 10% from 2025
- 3. Mitigate 10% p.a. from now





#### Put bluntly

- 66% chance of 2°C is lost
- 50% chance demands a war-like footing on mitigation
  - Wealthier nations 10% p.a. within a few years
  - Poorer nations 10% p.a. by 2035
- 33% chance still demands mitigation rates far beyond anything that will be discussed in the Paris COP21 negotiations
- We have 25 years of explicitly choosing to fail on 2°C

#### But it is a choice!





#### How can this be reconciled with 'official' accounts?

... mitigation costs would be so low that "global economic growth would not be strongly affected"

WGIII Co Chair Nov. 2014

"To keep ... to  $2^{\circ}$ C ... the UK [must] cut emissions by at least 80% ... the good news is that reductions of that size are possible without sacrificing the benefits of economic growth and rising prosperity."

UK Committee on Climate Change





#### ... two rabbits from the hat:

#### 1. Negative emissions technologies (BECCS):

Never worked at scale
huge technical & economic unknowns
major efficiency penalty
limited biomass availability (fuel or food?)
and fingers crossed on feedbacks

#### 2. Peak global emissions in the past





### Systemic bias: time travel & -ve CO<sub>2</sub> technologies

#### **IPCC Scenario database:**

- 400 scenarios for 50% or better chance of 2°C, of these:
  - 344 include large scale negative emissions
  - all 56 without negative emissions peak in ~2010
  - many use negative emissions & adopt a ~2010 peak







## Hypothesis: yes

#### ... but the probabilities are now very slim

(i.e. IPCC budget for only a 33% chance of staying below 2°C)





# A Radical Plan for 2°C – two phases

1. Deep reductions in energy demand from now to ~2030

... by the wealthy high emitters

2. Marshall-style plan build programme of very low-CO2 energy supply

... with 100% penetration by 2050





#### and a message of hope to finish ...

"at every level the greatest obstacle to transforming the world is that we lack the clarity and imagination to conceive that it could be different."

Robert Unger







Kevin Anderson University of Manchester Dec. 2015

